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van Ert: Dubious Dualism: The Reception of International Law in Canada

DUBIOUS DUALISM: THE RECEPTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CANADA
Gib van Ert*
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of how norms of public international law are received
into domestic legal systems is largely a matter of constitutional law. The
Canadian constitution—like so many things Canadian—resembles in
part both the American and the British models. Like the American
tradition, the Canadian constitution is based in large part on judicial
review of legislative and executive action against written constitutional
norms. Like the British tradition, however, the Canadian constitution
also includes an important unwritten element. Those wishing to
understand how public international law is received into Canadian law
will not find an answer in the written portion of the Canadian
constitution, which hardly refers to international law at all. One must
instead look to unwritten, English-derived constitutional practices and
principles.
The starting point, at least as far as treaties are concerned—treaties
being the preeminent source of contemporary international law—is the
royal prerogative over foreign affairs. In the Anglo-Canadian tradition,
foreign affairs, including treaty-making, is a purely executive function.1
There is no legal requirement that the legislative branch be consulted, or
involved in any way, in the executive’s decision to negotiate and
conclude a treaty.2
The second essential Anglo-Canadian legal principle informing the
Canadian approach to conventional international law is the English rule,
established through civil war and revolution, that the Crown is not a
source of law. Just as treaty-making is an exclusively executive act, lawmaking is an exclusively legislative act. In contrast to the American
recognition of some law-making power residing in the president (which

BA (McGill), MA (Cantab.), LLM (Toronto). Of the British Columbia Bar.
Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 877 (Can.).
2
There are, however, non-legal government policies in place governing the tabling of
treaties in Parliament, the publication of treaties, and other matters arising after the
executive’s decision to conclude a treaty. See Canada Treaty Information, Policy on Tabling
of Treaties in Parliament, http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/procedure.asp (last visited Feb.
8, 2010).
*
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one participant in the conference described as “presiprudence”),3 in the
Anglo-Canadian tradition the king’s act is not law.4
These two propositions drive towards a syllogistic conclusion about
the status of treaties in Canadian law. If treaties are made by the
executive, and the executive cannot make law, treaties must not be law.
That is largely accurate: Canadian courts, like those of England and
other Commonwealth countries, have repeatedly affirmed that a treaty is
not itself a source of domestic law. To state the proposition in American
parlance, no Canadian treaty is self-executing. All require legislative
implementation if they are to enjoy direct legal effect in Canadian law.5
This approach to the domestic reception of treaty norms, commonly
called dualism, does not wholly describe the Canadian reception system.
In Canada, rules of customary international law are directly incorporated
into the common law without legislative action. Furthermore, the
dualist approach to treaties is importantly qualified by judicial
interpretive practices. I have suggested elsewhere that Canada is neither
dualist nor monist, but a hybrid of the two models.6
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES
Treaties must be implemented, but what does implementation
mean? Canadian law offers no fixed answer. Canadian legislative
practice reveals a variety, a bewildering variety even, of implementation
forms. These range from express implementation of entire treaties by
primary legislation,7 to statutes or regulations that make no mention of
the treaty motivating them but effectively discharge the state’s treatyderived obligations,8 to reliance upon existing constitutional or

Robert Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security Presiprudence, 44 VAL.
U. L. REV. _____ (2010).
4
Archbishop of York and Sedgwick’s Case, (1612) 78 Eng. Rep. 122 (K.B.); Case of
Proclamations, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B.).
5
This statement oversimplifies the matter. Strictly speaking, no treaty can ever have
direct legal effect in Canadian law. The implementing statute, rather than the treaty behind
it, has legal effect. And yet, reference to and consideration of any treaty underlying an
implementing provision is not only permissible but positively desirable. As suggested
below, the real simplification here lies in the contention, strongly supported in Canadian
case law, that treaties are legal non-entities.
6
See G. VAN ERT, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CANADIAN COURTS 3–5 (2d ed. 2008).
7
E.g., Geneva Conventions Act, R.S.C., ch. G-3 (1985) (as amended).
8
E.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, s. 269.1 (1985) (as amended) (giving effect to
certain Canadian obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 [1987] Can. T.S. No. 36 but makes
no reference to that instrument).
3
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legislative provisions to meet the treaty’s requirements.9 In the absence
of legal requirements as to how treaties must be implemented, Canadian
legislatures are free to take a purely functional approach. The only rule
(if one can call it that) is the practical requirement that the
implementation method chosen must suffice to discharge the state’s
obligations.10 The constitutional principle that no treaty may be selfexecuting is, of course, a major difference between the Canadian and
American reception schemes. Two more differences are worthy of
mention.
First, a controversy has arisen in the United States in recent years
that has no parallel in Canada; it involves the desirability, and even the
propriety, of United States courts having regard to international and
foreign law in the course of their deliberations. Canadian lawyers are in
the habit of referring to and, where warranted, relying upon legal
precedents from other countries, perhaps due to their country’s mixed
legal heritage of English common law and French civil law, and to the
fact that until 1949 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was the
final court of appeal for Canada. Resort to international norms or
jurisprudence has not raised objections in principle, though the
relevance, proper use, and weight of such authority are issues that
inevitably must be considered. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) presents a striking recent example.11 The Supreme
Court of Canada overruled in part its own prior decision in R. v. Finta,12
basing its new decision on the desirability of conforming with decisions
of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former
Yugoslavia:
In the face of certain unspeakable tragedies, the
community of nations must provide a unified response.
Crimes against humanity fall within this category. The
interpretation and application of Canadian provisions
regarding crimes against humanity must therefore
accord with international law. Our nation’s deeply held

9
E.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (UK) (The federal government frequently
relies upon this for partial implementation of Canadian obligations under human rights
treaties.); GAOR, Human Rights Comm., Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States
Parties: Canada, ¶ 137, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/1/Add.91 (1998) .
10
See G. VAN ERT, supra note 6, at 238–52 .
11
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40 (Can.).
12
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.).
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commitment to individual human dignity, freedom and
fundamental rights requires nothing less.13
Mugesera is no doubt the high-water mark, but it serves to illustrate the
openness of Canadian courts to not only considering, but relying upon,
international law in proper cases.
A second notable difference between Canadian and U.S. approaches
to international legal questions arises because Canadian law recognizes
no doctrine by which courts defer to governmental interpretations of
international legal questions, including the meaning of treaties. Rather,
Canadian courts appear to regard international legal questions as just
that—legal questions for determination by courts.14 I am not aware of
any case in which a Canadian court expressly states that the submissions
of the federal government on a question of international law ought to be
deferred to.
To the contrary, Canadian courts have repeatedly
considered and decided upon such questions themselves—to be sure,
with assistance of government counsel—but without any suggestion that
they give greater weight to the government’s position compared to
opposing views simply because the arguments came from the
government.
In contrast to the orthodox view that treaties take no direct effect in
Canadian law, the Canadian approach to customary international law
follows the English example. Customary international law is said to be
directly incorporated by the common law, without the need for
legislative intervention but subject to conflicting domestic litigation.
Thus, if a litigant can establish before a Canadian court that a given
proposition represents a rule of customary international law, and is not
ousted by express statutory provision, she may proceed to rely on that
rule as if it were a common law rule. The similarity between the English
and Canadian positions on this point was expressly invoked by Mr.
Justice Rand, who wrote in Municipality of Saint John v. Fraser-Bruce
Overseas Corp.:

Mugesera, 2 S.C.R. at 178.
At least that is the substantive approach shown by Canadian courts. Despite this,
many courts in recent years have tolerated evidentiary procedures that permit parties
effectively to make legal submissions by means of expert opinions on international legal
controversies. There is judicial authority against this approach, which is out of keeping
with the general Canadian treatment of international law as law, not fact. See the
discussions in Frédéric Bachand, The “Proof” of Foreign Normative Facts Which Influence
Domestic Rules, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 269 (2005); G. van Ert, The Admissibility of
International Legal Evidence, 84 CANADIAN B. REV. 31 (2005).
13
14
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If in 1767 Lord Mansfield, as in Heathfield v. Chilton
[(1767), 4 Burr. 2015, 98 E.R. 50], could say, “The law of
nations will be carried as far in England, as any where”,
in this country, in the 20th century, in the presence of the
United Nations and the multiplicity of impacts with
which technical developments have entwined the entire
globe, we cannot say any thing less.15
The incorporation doctrine may be more remarkable in theory than
in practice. Only a handful of Canadian cases have recognized rules of
customary international law as decisive in the outcome of disputes,
possibly for several simple reasons. First, not many rules of customary
international law have relevance to domestic legal disputes. Customary
rules tend to define the rights and powers of states against other states.
Second, proving support for a supposed custom by the required degree
of state practice and opinio juris is particularly difficult in an Ontario or
Saskatchewan trial court. Third, rules of custom enter Canadian law
through the common law and are therefore susceptible to legislative
curtailment. Where an alleged custom is contrary to an existing
Canadian statute, its incorporation by the common law is preempted (or
at least made purely academic) by that legislative fact.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
While no description of Canadian reception law can ignore custom,
by far the more significant legal questions arise from the interaction
between Canada’s treaty obligations and its domestic laws, whether
constitutional, statutory, or common. Partly due to the incorporation of
custom, Canada’s reception scheme is not as dualist as the orthodox
approach to treaties may suggest. But the more important qualification
of Canada’s dualist stance, in my view, arises from Canadian judicial
interpretive practices. For every Canadian decision affirming that
treaties are not a source of law, often in the same decision, there is
another argument that supports the counter proposition that Canadian
courts strive to interpret domestic laws in conformity with the state’s
international legal obligations.
The interpretive rule for conformity with international legal
obligations is most usually described as a rebuttable presumption—an
obstacle that a party who seeks to advance an internationally noncompliant interpretation of a given Canadian legal norm must overcome.
The most remarkable Canadian description of this presumption is that of
15

[1958] S.C.R. 263, 268–69 (Can.).
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Mr. Justice Lebel for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
recent decision of R. v. Hape:
It is a well-established principle of statutory
interpretation that legislation will be presumed to
conform to international law. The presumption of
conformity is based on the rule of judicial policy that, as
a matter of law, courts will strive to avoid constructions
of domestic law pursuant to which the state would be in
violation of its international obligations, unless the
wording of the statute clearly compels that result. R.
Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of
Statutes, explains that the presumption has two aspects.
First, the legislature is presumed to act in compliance
with Canada’s obligations as a signatory of international
treaties and as a member of the international
community.
In
deciding
between
possible
interpretations, courts will avoid a construction that
would place Canada in breach of those obligations. The
second aspect is that the legislature is presumed to
comply with the values and principles of customary and
conventional international law.
Those values and
principles form part of the context in which statutes are
enacted, and courts will therefore prefer a construction
that reflects them. The presumption is rebuttable,
however. Parliamentary sovereignty requires courts to
give effect to a statute that demonstrates an unequivocal
legislative intent to default on an international
obligation.16
This passage makes a number of important points about the
Canadian interpretive approach with respect to international law. To
begin, the presumption of conformity is characterized as a “judicial
policy,” or as an earlier Supreme Court decision described it, the “duty
of the Court” to construe a statute “with a view to fulfilling Canada’s
international obligations.”17 This language suggests that an absence of
positive legislative intent to conform to international law is not decisive,
nor even relevant. A second notable aspect of this passage is its
description of international legal values and principles as part of the
context in which statutes are enacted. Canadian courts take a contextual
16
17

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss3/9

[2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 2007 SCC 26 at 53 (Can.) (citation omitted).
R. v. Zingre, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392 at 409–10 (Can.).
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approach to statutory interpretation whereby the words of an enactment
are “read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary
sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and
the intention of Parliament.”18 Under such an approach, treaties or other
sources of international law might be regarded as external interpretive
aids of questionable legitimacy. Against this view, the passage quoted
above characterizes international law as a contextual factor to be
considered together with the enactment’s express terms, scheme, and
object. International law is part of the interpretive exercise.
Finally, the passage from Hape quoted above affirms that the
presumption of conformity is rebuttable. This must be so, for it is an
unwritten constitutional principle (again inherited from English law)
that Canadian legislatures are sovereign, empowered to legislate on any
matter and not to be gainsaid by any other body.19 In Canada this
sovereignty is massively qualified by the written constitution, which
imposes a variety of jurisdictional limits on Parliament and the
provincial legislatures, limits enforced by the judiciary. However,
Canadian legislatures remain omnipotent and omnicompetent in those
areas not subject to constitutional review, such as international law. As a
practical result a litigant may not seek judicial review of a Canadian
statute solely on the basis that it is contrary to international law; there
being no power in a Canadian court to control an internationally
unlawful legislative act. It follows that the presumption of conformity
with international law is a rebuttable one. But what must a litigant, or a
legislature, do to rebut the presumption? The quoted passage states that
parliamentary sovereignty requires courts to give effect to statutes that
demonstrate “unequivocal legislative intent to default” on the state’s
international obligations.20 That appears to be a very high standard.
Certainly there are very few decided cases in which Canadian courts
have held that the presumption of conformity with international law was
rebutted by express legislative action.21

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, ¶ 21 (Can.) (citing ELMER DRIEDGER,
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 87 (2d ed. 1983)).
19
ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
39–40 (10th ed., Macmillan 1959).
20
Hape, 2 S.C.R. at 53.
21
A notorious instance is Coop. Comm. on Japanese Canadians v. Attorney Gen. for Canada,
[1947] A.C. 87 (P.C.) (Can.), in which the Privy Council upheld the forcible removal of
“persons of the Japanese race” from Canada to Japan, rejecting the appellants’ argument
that the legislation enabling the removals must be construed as authorizing only orders
consistent with accepted principles of international law, and that the removals were
contrary to international law. The Privy Council found the presumption to be rebutted by
war-time conditions.
18
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IV. CONCLUSION
The vigour accorded to the presumption of conformity in R. v. Hape
(and other cases) puts into question the orthodox account of treaties in
Canadian law. While it is accurate in many respects to say that the
Crown is not a source of law, and thus Canadian treaty obligations are
not law, the presumption of conformity clearly accords some legal
weight to treaties by the interpretive influence they enjoy. Where two
interpretations of a given statutory provision are available, and the court
opts for the interpretation that best conforms to a treaty to which Canada
is a party, the treaty (and the executive action by which it was
concluded) is surely being accorded some legal significance. The
inevitable conclusion, in my view, is that description of Canada as a
dualist jurisdiction is a convenient shorthand, but also an oversimplification.22

22
I respectfully agree with the observation of Mr. Justice Pigeon, dissenting, in Capital
Cities Commc’ns, Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Comm’n, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 188 (Can): “It
is an oversimplification to say that treaties are of no legal effect unless implemented by
legislation.”
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